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Abstract
This paper examines the linkage between dividend policy and institutional ownership within the
context of the dividend model of Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000). Specifically, it provides an
empirical test of Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000)’s novel implication that a tax differential between
institutions and retail investors effects dividend policies. Using merge data of US industrial firms from
1980-2002, our results indicate that the dividend paying decision is positively related with institutional
ownership. That is, firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to be dividend payers.
Further, we find that the deferred tax or tax credits that the institutional investors own significantly
contribute to the dividend initiation decision as well as the level of dividend payments.
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1. Introduction
Miller and Modigliani (1961) suggested that in a
frictionless world without taxes or transaction costs,
dividends and share repurchases are equivalent
policies. Thus a company’s dividend policy is
irrelevant to the value of the firm. When dividends are
taxed more heavily than stock subject to capital gains
rates, which had been the case under the IRS tax code
until the 2003 tax reform act, then share repurchases
would appear to be superior to dividends. We would
therefore anticipate more share repurchases than
dividends due to the tax differential. The actual data
indicate, however, that there is a significant
proportion of dividend payers and a larger percentage
of dividend paying firms than firms making share
repurchases. This is called the dividend puzzle.
There is a growing body of literature attempting
to explain the dividend puzzle. One explanation
relates to the 1974 Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA). ERISA subjected private
pension fund managers to the prudent man rule. The
application of the prudent man rule led to investment
policy and institutional charter restrictions that require
institutions to favor dividend paying stocks, especially
those with high dividend yields. Brav and Heaton
(1998) documented that many institutional investors
abandoned dividend-omitting firms after the prudent
man rule was required. And when firms reinitiated
dividends, the effect reversed.
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Tax-exempt institutions also favor higher
dividend yields because of their higher pretax
expected returns. Shleifer and Vishny (1986)
recognized that dividends can be a mechanism to
compensate institutional investors. Michaely, Thaler,
and Womack (1995) examined volume changes
around dividend changes as indicators of clientele
rearrangements.25 Dhaliwal, Erickson, and Trezevant
(1998) found that the initiation of dividend payments
led to an increase in institutional ownership.
Specifically, they found that tax-exempt/tax-deferred
and corporate investors increased their ownership in
firms that initiated cash dividends as these investors
purchased shares sold by individual investors for
whom dividends were tax-disadvantaged. These
studies provided evidence that institutional ownership
and firm dividend policy are related and led to
increased interest in further examining the direct
linkage between dividend policy and institutional
ownership.
More recently, Allen, Bernardo and Welch
(2000) examined how a tax differential between
individual investors and institutional investors would
impact a firm’s dividend policy. They predicted that
when institutional investors are relatively less taxed
than individual investors, dividends induce
“ownership clientele” effects. Their prediction is
25

For a rather comprehensive review of some earlier work
regarding dividend policy and institutional ownership,
please refer to Allen and Michaely (1995).
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based on two assumptions. First, investors are taxed
differently and invest rationally, so dividends can
induce specific clientele changes. Second, the
presence of institutional clientele can increase the
value of the firm. Consequently, firms paying
dividends attract relatively more institutions, and
institutions have a relative advantage in detecting high
quality firms and in ensuring that firms are well
managed. The Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000)
model found that by titling their portfolios in favor of
dividend-paying stocks, tax-exempt institutions gain
higher rates of return even though they may incur a
loss of some diversification benefits and an increase
in monitoring costs.
Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002) examined the
role of institutional ownership in relation to dividend
payout ratios within the context of the dividend
models of Lintner (1956), Waud (1966), and Fama
and Babiak (1968) using a United Kingdom (UK)
panel data set. Using dummy variables for ownership
data, they found positive association between a
dividend payout policy and institutional ownership.
Tax effects, however, were not directly tested and the
institutional framework and ownership structures in
UK are quite different from those of the US.
Baker and Wurgler (2003) proposed a catering
theory of dividends. They argued that the decision to
pay dividends is driven by prevailing investor demand
for dividend payers. Their theory implies a close link
between fluctuations in the propensity to pay
dividends and catering incentives. Relying on
regressions of future excess returns of dividendpayers and non-dividend-payers on the changes in the
propensity to pay dividends, their empirical work
explained the post-1977 disappearance of dividends as
well as earlier appearances and disappearances. Baker
and Wurgler (2003), however, did not specify for
whom the firms are catering.
This paper provides an empirical test of Allen,
Bernardo and Welch (2000)’s implication that a tax
differential between institutions and retail investors
effects dividend policies. When institutional
investors’ deferred taxes & investment tax credits
increase, we anticipate that they have increased
demand for dividend payments because deferred taxes
and investment credits can offset dividend payments
for tax purposes. Hence we predict that institutional
investors’ deferred taxes & investment tax credits are
positively correlated with the probability of a firm
being a dividend payer as well as the level of dividend
payment.
Using dividend data
from the
CRSP/COMPUSTAT
merged
database
and
institutional ownership data from the Thomson
Financial CDA/Spectrum S34 13f Institutional
Holdings from 1980-2002, excluding financial and
utility firms, we first examine the linkage between
dividend policy and institutional ownership using a
logit regression, then examine the relationship
between the level of dividend payment and
institutional ownership deferred tax or investment tax

credit using cross-section time series data. Our results
are consistent with our hypotheses.
Our paper contributes to the literature by
empirically testing how institutional ownership and
institutional deferred taxes and investment tax credits
effect firm dividend policies. While Dhaliwal,
Erickson, and Trezevant (1998) provided evidence
that the effects of tax clienteles for dividend policies
are strong enough to influence the decisions of
investors, our paper provides evidence from a
different perspective – that is, higher institutional
ownership and larger institutional deferred taxes and
tax credits induce higher dividend payments. Our
paper also sheds light on the question - for whom are
firms catering their dividends. This question was left
an unanswered in Baker and Wurgler (2003). The
theory provided by Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000)
behind our empirical work further allows us to
improve on Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002) by using
actual ownership data instead of dummy variables to
examine the direct linkage between the change of
dividend payment and institutional ownership. The
use of ownership dummy variables in Short, Zhang
and Keasey (2002) made it difficult to characterize
different dividend payments across firms with
institutional ownership.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes the sample and variables. Section
3 presents the hypotheses and methodology. Section 4
reports the results. Section 5 summarizes the paper.
2. Sample, Variables and Time Trends
2.1 Sample and variables
Data are from two sources - the CRSP/COMPUSTAT
merged database and the Thomson Financial
CDA/Spectrum S34 13f Institutional Holdings.
Sample
period
is
1980-2002.
From
the
CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged data, we extract
dividends per share (Item DATA26 in the database),
stock price per share (DATA199), common shares
outstanding (DATA25), Deferred Tax & Invest Tax
Credit (DATA35), Deferred Taxes at income account
(DATA50), Investment Tax Credit at income account
(DATA51) and Deferred Taxes at balance sheet
(DATA74). We further extract equity in the Balance
Sheet and use it as a proxy for book value per share to
calculate the book value / market value (BV/MV)
ratio for subsequent regression analysis. Following
Fama and French (2000), a firm must have market
equity data at year t to be in the sample for the year.
Both utility firms (SIC codes 4900-4949) and
financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) are excluded.
These industries may have regulatory requirements
for high dividend payouts which are independent of
any benefits of attracting institutions.
From the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum S34
13f Institutional Holdings database we extract the
number of shares held by managers at the end of each
of quarter (variable SHARES at 13f database). Since
13f data are aggregated to a manager level, we then
129
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calculate institutional holdings by totaling all manager
level holdings based on manager number (MGRNO)
for each quarter. Given that the CRSP/COMPUSTAT
data are annual data while the 13f are quarterly data,
we retain number of shares as of the last quarter as
institutional holding in a particular year. We also
further extract industry code (Industry) for subsequent
regression analysis. The variables from the two
datasets are then merged through an 8 digit CUSIP of
the stock and YEAR in consideration. After the data
are merged, we calculate institutional ownership in
percentage terms (INST) by dividing institutional
holdings by the total common shares outstanding. If a
ratio is outside of the range of 0-1, the observation is
treated as an outlier and is deleted.
Similar to Fama and French (2000), we then
classify sample firms into two categories – those who
pay dividends (Payer) and those who do not pay
dividend (Non-payer). In the Payer group, those
newly listed firms that are dividend payers are further
recognized as Newpayer. The Non-payers are also
further separated into 1) those having never paid
(Neverpaid); and 2) those formerly paying but then
having stopped paying (Formerpayer). Following
Fama and French (2001), these are the "firms that do
not pay in year t but did pay in a previous year”.
Table 1 gives the summary statistics of the key
variables. It shows that 47% of the observations in the
sample are Payers (3% of which are Newpayers) and
53% are Non-payers (8% Former-payers and 45%
Neverpaids). Note the summation of Payer and Nonpayer equals one. Table 1 also shows that the mean
dividend per share in our sample is $0.35 on an
annual basis with a standard deviation of 0.89 and the
mean annual institutional ownership is 27% with a
standard deviation of 0.24. Mean market capital of the
sample firms is about $1,576 million and mean book
to market value ratio is 0.51. The table further reports
the means and standard deviations of the deferred tax
and investment tax credit measures. Mean
institutional Deferred Tax and Investment Tax Credit
and Deferred Taxes at Balance Sheet are $62.41 and
$62.95 respectively, with standard deviations of
412.09 and 411.09. The means of Deferred Tax at
Income Account and Investment Tax Credit at Income
Account are $1.47 and $1.52 respectively and the
standard deviations are 88.93 and 15.45. Note the
numbers of Deferred Tax & Invest Tax Credit and
Deferred Taxes at Balance Sheet are similar, because
both measures represent the accumulated tax deferrals
due to timing differences between the reporting of
revenues and expenses for financial statements and
tax purposes with small differences in the items being
excluded in the calculations26. Similarly, Deferred
Tax at Income Account and Investment Tax Credit at
Income Account both represent the amortized portion
of tax savings that reduces the current year's tax
liability.
26

Please refer to CRSP manual for details of how the items
are defined.
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Table 1 about here
2.2 Time trend in dividends and
institutional ownership
Figure 1A shows the percentage of dividend paying
firms vs. non-dividend paying firms over time. The
proportion of Payers declines consistently throughout
sample period from about 60% in 1980 to just slightly
over 30% in 2002. This observation is consistent with
the patterns documented in Fama and French (2001).
Conversely, the proportion of non-dividend paying
firms has been increasing concavely from about 40%
in 1980 to close to 70% in 2002.
Figure 1B shows the percentage of newly listed
firms that are dividend payers from 1980-2002. In
1980, the percentage of newly listed firms that are
dividend payers was as high as 60%. Over the years,
the percentage declined significantly to as low as
under 10% from 1995-1997 before increasing to over
40% in 2001. In 2002, the percentage declined to
under 30%. Figure 1C shows the percentage of firms
that having never paid dividends vs. those former
dividend payers. Among the non-dividend paying
firms, the percentages of Formerpayers are much
lower than those of the Neverpaids over the years. In
fact, the percentage of former payers shows a
declining trend. The percentage declined from slightly
under 30% in the early 80s to below 10% in 2002,
indicating a trend of fewer firms terminating dividend
payments over time.
Figure 1A, 1B, and 1C about here
Figure 2 illustrates the amounts of dividends
being paid on a yearly basis compared with mean
annual level of institutional ownerships throughout
the sample period. Institutional ownership has
increased steadily from slightly less than 20% to just
below 35% from 1980 to 2002. Consistent with the
literature, average annual dividends also demonstrate
a steadily increasing pattern. It increased from under
$0.15 per share in 1980 to over $0.35 per share in
2002. While we observe that average annual dividend
amount are increasing, recall that Figure 1A shows
the percentage of firms that are dividend payers is
declining. A possible explanation for these observed
patterns is even though the number of firms paying
dividends has been decreasing, dividend paying firms
increase the dividend amounts as institutional
ownership increases.
Figure 2 about here
3. Hypotheses, Methodology, and Results
3.1
Hypotheses
Our testable hypotheses are based on Allen, Bernardo
and Welch (2000) that institutional ownership affects
the firm’s dividend policy. We expect that:
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(1). Dividend Payers are more likely to associate
with institutional investors than Non-payers.
Assuming investors are taxed differently and invest
rationally, Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000)
predicted that there is an “ownership clientele” effect.
Consequently, firms paying dividends attract
relatively more institutional investors.
(2). Dividend Payers with institutional ownership
are more likely continue to be future payers than Nonpayers. This hypothesis is based on the smoothing
effect discussed in Allen, Bernardo, and Welch
(2000). Firms that pay dividends try not to reduce the
amount of the dividend, because their clientele
(institutions) are precisely the kind of investors that
will punish them for it. Thus dividend paying firms
will try to keep dividends relatively smooth.
(3). Dividend Payers are more likely to associate
with large deferred taxes and investment credits than
Non-payers. When institutional investors have
deferred taxes & investment tax credits, they favor
dividends because dividends can offset the deferred
taxes and investment credits for tax purposes. Hence
we see dividend Payers are more likely to associate
with deferred taxes and investment credits than Nonpayers.
(4). Dividend amount is positively related with
institutional ownership. Due to institutional investors’
demand for dividend payments, we expect to see that
firms with higher institutional ownership are related
to higher dividend payouts.
(5). Dividend amount is positively correlated with
the level of institutional investors’ deferred taxes &
investment tax credits. Given dividends can induce
clientele changes, Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000)
predict that tax differences between institutions and
retail investors are significant determinants of
dividend payments. Hence we predict that higher
institutional investors’ deferred taxes & investment
tax credits are associated with higher dividend
amounts.
Logit and time-series cross sectional regressions
are applied to test the hypotheses. Model
specifications and regressions results are presented in
the following subsections.
3.2
Methodology
3.2.1 Logit regression models
Before we begin our regression analysis, we examine
the correlations between the independent variables
and future regression dependent variable Dividend per
Share. The numbers are reported in Table 2 showing
positive correlations. Further, note that the
correlations among the different tax credit measures,
such as Deferred tax and Investment Tax Credit and
Deferred Taxes at Balance Sheet, are high (0.9967),
we hence use one tax credit measure at a time in the
subsequent regression analyses.
Table 2 about here

To test Hypothesis (1), we first adopt the
following logit models

(Model 1)

(Model 2)

Payeri ,t equals to 1 if firmi’s dividend per share
at Yeart is positive; 0 otherwise.

Insti ,t is the

percentage of firmi’s stock owned by institutional
investors at Yeart. Factors related to the probability
being dividend payer, i.e., size, which is measured by
market capital, BV/MV ratio, and industry
classification are used as control variables.
Based on the hypothesis, the coefficients for
Insti ,t is expected to be positive signaling a positive
relationship between institutional ownership and a
firm being a dividend payer.
To test Hypothesis (2), we examine the
determinants of former dividend payers and firms
having never paid dividend as follows.

(Model 3)
(Model 4)
Based on the hypothesis, we expect to see the
coefficients for Insti ,t to be negative for Neverpaid
and Formerpayers confirming it is less likely these
firms would stop paying dividends or having never
paid dividends when institutional ownership is high.
To test deferred tax or tax credit and the
probability of a firm being a dividend payer as in
Hypothesis (3), we first adopt the following models:

Where Deftaxi ,t

(Models 5-8)
is deferred tax or tax credit,

which is Deferred Tax & Investment Tax Credit,
Deferred Taxes at income account, Investment Tax
Credit at income account or Deferred Taxes at balance
sheet, one tax measure at a time, in models 5-8. Based
on our hypotheses, the coefficients for Deftaxi ,t are
expected to be positive signaling a positive
relationship between a firm being a dividend payer
and institutional tax benefits.
We subsequently adopt the following multivariate
models to jointly test the relationship between a
dividend payer and institutional ownership and
institutional deferred tax and tax credit.
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(Models 9-12)
We expect both coefficients for Insti ,t and

Deftaxi ,t to be positive signaling a positive
relationship between the likelihood of dividend payers
and institutional tax credits when institutional
ownership is controlled for.
3.3.1 Cross
sectional
time-series
regression models
The following linear unbalanced panel data univariate
regressions and multivariate regressions are
conducted to test the direct relationship between
dividend payments and tax difference as well as
institutional ownership as in Hypotheses (4) and (5)
(Model 13)
(Models 14-17)
(Models 18-21)

Dividendi ,t is the dividend per share paid by
firm i at year t . The other variables have the same
definition as before. Similarly, we expect that both
coefficients for institutional ownership and tax credits
will be positive.
4. Results
4.1 Logit regression results
Table 3 presents the results of the logit regressions. At
column (1) where the dependent variable is current
payers and the independent variable is Insti ,t , the
coefficient for

Insti ,t is positive (1.263) and

statistically significant at the one percent level as
expected. This indicates Payers are more likely to
associate with institutional ownership. Interestingly,
different from what we expected to see at column (2),
when the dependent variable is newly listed firms that
pay dividends (Newpayers), the coefficient is negative
(-1.166) and statistically significant at the 1% level.
By examining the data, we find that the average
institutional ownership for newly listed firms is much
lower than the others. Thus, as Fama and French
(2000) suggested, we believe that the dividend
payment decision for newly listed firms is more likely
to be determined by the characteristics of firms that
have never paid dividends. In column (3) when the
dependent variable is Formerpayer, the coefficient for
Insti ,t is negative (-1.984) and the coefficient is
again statistically significant. The negative correlation
is consistent with hypothesis (3). It can be interpreted
as firms with larger institutional ownership are less
likely to stop paying dividends. Similarly, when the
132

dependent variable is Neverpaid as in column (4), the
significant negative estimate (-1.166) implies that
firms with higher proportions of institutional investors
are less likely to be firms that have never paid
dividends. These results support the theory that firms
decide to pay dividends to attract relatively more
institutions, and institutions have a relative advantage
in detecting high firm quality and in ensuring that
firms are well managed.
Columns 5-8 in Table 3 provide the estimation
results of the deferred tax or tax credit effect on the
probability of being a dividend payer. As we can see
from the table, the coefficients for all four deferred
tax measures are positive (0.005, 0.02, 0.001 and
0.005 respectively) and statistically significant at the
one percent level.
The last four columns (9-12) in Table 3 report
multivariate regression results. The coefficients for
Insti ,t in the four models are 2.218, 1.931 and 2.364
and 2.197 respectively while the corresponding
Deftaxi ,t coefficients are 0.004, 0.01, 0.00, and
0.004 respectively. These results are consistent with
those from the univariate regressions, confirming the
implication of the Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000)
theory that tax differences between institutions and
retail investors are significant determinants of
dividend payments.
Table 3 about here
4.2
Cross sectional time-series
regression results
The regression results are reported in Table 4. The
first 5 columns report the univariate results and
columns 6-9 report the multivariate results. The
results from both univariate regressions and the
multivariate regressions are consistent hence we only
discuss the multivariate results. Consistent with the
results in Table 3, coefficients for institutional
ownership and tax credits are positive and statistically
significant at the one percent level. For example, the
coefficient for Insti ,t is 0.272, 0.267, 0.250 and
0.272 respectively when the tax credit measures are
Deferred Tax & Investment Tax Credit, Deferred
Taxes at income account, Investment Tax Credit at
income account and Deferred Taxes at balance sheet
respectively. These results are consistent with
Hypotheses (3) and (4) suggesting that the dividend
amount is positively correlated with institutional
ownership and deferred tax and investment tax
credits. Note that in the regressions, all year dummies
are included but the results are not reported for space
efficiency. Further, we also look at the same analysis
in a dynamic setting, that is, we look at how changes
of institutional ownership and deferred tax and tax
credits effect changes in dividend payments. The
results are positive as expected, they are, however, not
significant. Hence we are not reporting them here.
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Table 4 about here

3.

5. Summary

4.

This paper examines the link between dividend policy
and institutional ownership within the context of the
dividend theory of Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000).
Using dividend data from the CRSP/COMPUSTAT
merged database and institutional ownership data
from the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum S34 13f
Institutional Holdings from 1980-2002, excluding all
financial and utilities firms, we first examine the
linkage between dividend policy and institutional
ownership using a logit regression, then examine the
relationship between the level of dividend payment
and institutional ownership and institutional deferred
tax or tax credit using cross-section time series data.
The results from our regressions provide support for
the hypothesis that dividend payers are more
associated with institutional investors than nonpayers. That is, the firms with higher institutional
ownership are more likely to pay and continue to pay
dividends. Further, we find that tax credit or deferred
taxes significantly contribute to the initiation of the
dividend and the dividend amount. These results
support the predictions in Allen, Bernardo and Welch
(2000).
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Appendices
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable
Current Dividend Payer (yes=1 no=0)
New Dividend Payer (yes=1 no=0)
Not Current Dividend Payer (yes=1 no=0)
Former Dividend Payer (yes=1 no=0)
Never Paid Dividend (yes=1 no=0)
Dividend Per Share ($)
Total Dividend (million$)
Retained Earnings (million$)
Deferred Tax & Invest Tax Credit (million$)
Deferred Tax (Income Account) (million$)
Deferred Taxes (Balance Sheet) (million$)
Investment Tax Credit (Income Acct) (million$)
Annual Institutional Ownership
Market Cap Value (million$)
Book to Market Ratio

Obs
68,476
68,562
68,476
68,562
68,562
68,476
68,476
13,270
55,469
52,013
53,622
33,094
68,562
68,530
62,211

Mean
0.47
0.03
0.53
0.08
0.45
0.35
27.69
165.68
62.41
1.47
62.95
1.52
0.27
1,576.84
0.51

Std. Dev.
0.50
0.17
0.50
0.27
0.50
0.89
175.29
852.50
412.09
88.93
411.57
15.45
0.24
9,775.24
4.76

Data are from two sources - the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database and the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum S34 13f Institutional
Holdings. Sample period is 1980-2002. Table 1 gives the summary statistics of the key variables in the sample.
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Table 2. Correlation Table

Institutional Ownership
Dividend per Share
Deferred Tax & Invest Tax
Credit
Deferred Tax (Income Account)
Investment Tax Credit (Income
Acct)
Deferred Taxes (Balance Sheet)
Market Cap Value
Book to Market Ratio

Deferred Tax & Deferred Tax
Institutional Dividend per Invest Tax
(Income
Ownership
Share
Credit
Account)
1
0.0802
1
0.0904
0.0363

0.185
0.0432

1
0.2326

1

0.041
0.0914
0.092
-0.0381

0.174
0.174
0.1029
0.0082

0.2312
0.9967
0.5115
-0.0088

0.0252
0.2319
0.1176
0.0024

Invest. Tax
Credit
(Income
Acct)

1
0.1955
0.1089
0.0054

Deferred
Book to
Taxes
(Balance
Market Market
Sheet) Cap Value Ratio

1
0.5165
-0.0093

1
-0.0228

1

Data are from two sources - the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database and the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum S34 13f Institutional
Holdings. Sample period is 1980-2002. Table 2 reports the correlation between the independent variables and the dependent variable
(Dividend) in the subsequent regressions. Notice that the correlations among the different taxes are high, so we use one tax variable at a time
in the subsequent regression analysis.

Table 3. The Effect of Institutional Ownership and Tax Credits on the Probability of Dividend Payment
Logit Model: The dependant variable equals 1 if the company is the current dividend payer for model 1 and model 512, otherwise 0. The dependant variable equals 1 if the company is a former dividend payer in model 2, never paid
dividend in model 3 and new dividend payer in model 4, otherwise 0.
Never
Current New Former
Current Current Current Current Current Current Current Current
Paid
Dividen Dividen Dividend
Dividend Dividend Dividend Dividend Dividend Dividend Dividend Dividend
Dividen
d Payer d Payer Payer
Payer
Payer
Payer
Payer
Payer
Payer
Payer
Payer
Independent Variables
d
Models
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Institutional Ownership 1.263
-1.427 -1.984 -1.166
2.218
1.931
2.364
2.197
(0.038)* (0.172)* (0.080)** (0.037)*
(0.045)** (0.057)** (0.046)** (0.046)**
**
**
*
**
*
*
*
*
Deferred Tax & Invest
Tax Credit
0.005
0.004
(0.000)**
(0.000)**
*
*
(DATA35)
Investment Tax Credit

0.020

0.010

(Income Acct,
DATA51)
Deferred Tax
(Income Account,
DATA50 )
Deferred Taxes
(Balance Sheet,
DATA74)

(0.004)**
*

(0.003)**
*

Table 3 continued

Market Cap Value

0.000
(0.000)*
**
Book to Market Ratio 0.257
(0.013)*
**
Industry Code Number -0.000
(0.000)*
**
Constant
0.939
(0.069)*
**
Observations
62140
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0.001
(0.000)**
*

0.000
(0.000)**
*
0.005
(0.000)**
*

0.000
(0.000)*
0.157
(0.030)*
**
0.000
(0.000)*
**
1.067
(0.108)*
**
62211

0.004
(0.000)**
*

-0.000 -0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.000)** (0.000)* (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
*
**
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
-0.003 -0.099 0.109
0.053
0.110
0.116
0.185
0.112
0.193
0.191
(0.011)* (0.012)** (0.014)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.014)** (0.017)** (0.015)** (0.015)**
(0.002) **
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
0.000
0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000)** (0.000)* (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
*
**
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
-1.236 -1.195 1.737
2.073
1.876
1.697
1.399
1.775
1.485
1.362
(0.075)** (0.069)* (0.072)** (0.085)** (0.075)** (0.072)** (0.073)** (0.086)** (0.076)** (0.074)**
*
**
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
62211 62211 55170 32899 51755 53335 55170 32899 51755 53335
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Table 4. Linear Effect of Institutional Ownership and Tax on Dividend Payment
Current Dividend Payer

Independent Variables

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
0.214
0.272
0.250
0.267
0.272
(0.021)***
(0.021)*** (0.024)*** (0.020)*** (0.022)***
Deferred Tax & Invest Tax Credit
0.000
0.000
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
Investment Tax Credit (Income Acct)
0.003
0.003
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
Deferred Tax (Income Account)
0.000
0.000
(0.000)**
(0.000)**
Deferred Taxes (Balance Sheet)
0.000
0.000
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
Market Cap Value
0.000
-0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.000
(0.000)*** (0.000)
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)
Book to Market Ratio
0.000
0.000
-0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.002
0.000
0.000
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Industry Code Number
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Constant
0.536
0.601
0.688
0.583
0.596
0.574
0.657
0.559
0.569
(0.026)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.025)*** (0.026)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.025)*** (0.026)***
Observations
62140
55170
32899
51755
53335
55170
32899
51755
53335
Models
Institutional Ownership

Standard errors in parentheses.* indicates significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%
Data are from two sources - the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database and the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum S34 13f Institutional
Holdings. Sample period is 1980-2002. All year dummies are included but chosen not to report them for space efficiency.

Figure 1A. Percentage of Dividend Paying Firms vs. Non-Dividend Paying Firms 1980-2002
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Figure 1B. Percentage of Newly Listed Firms That Are Dividend Payers 1980-2002
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Fig ure 1 C. Percen tag e o f Firms of Fo rmerly Hav ing Paid v s. Firms Having Never Paid 1 98 0-2 00 2
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Figure 2. Institutional Ownership and Average Annual Dividend Amount 1980-2002

0,40
0,35

Ownership and dividend

0,30
0,25
0,20
0,15
0,10
0,05
0,00
1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

2001

2002

Year

Annual Average Institutional Share

136

Annual Average Dividend Payment (adjusted by 1/100)

